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Abstract
The decision of a preferential trading agreement (PTA) to form a currency union 
adds a new dimension to the debate over whether PTA’s are a step forward or backwards 
in the quest for world wide free trade.
This paper looks at the effects the introduction of the euro has had on trade within 
the European Union (EU). Using trade data for the twenty-three industrialized countries 
as classified by the International Monetary Fund, ordinary least-squares was applied to a 
gravity model of bilateral trade. Independent variables included: gross domestic product 
(GDP), per capita GDP, a distance measure, adjacency, common language, membership 
in the EU, and membership in the euro-zone.
Parameter estimates show that membership in the Euro-zone increased trade 
nearly one and a half times over nonmembers. Tests on data from subsequent years will 
be needed before definite conclusions can be reached, but these initial results are 
consistent with other researchers.
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11.0 Introduction
1.1 The ’Question1
The introduction of the euro (€) as the common currency unit of the European 
Union (EU), has added an element to the debate on the economic benefits of regional 
trading agreements. In spite of being acknowledged as ‘second-best’ to unrestricted 
world free trade, regional trading agreements have proliferated under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the post World War II (WWII) period.
Nearly a third of the post WWII trade agreements were reported to GATT in the period 
1990 to 1994 (Frankel 1997).
Trade agreements follow a progression of arrangements from most-favored-nation 
(MFN) through economic unions, of which a currency union is one manifestation. This 
paper will look at how the introduction of the euro, as the common currency of the EU 
has effected the patterns of trade both between the EU members and with the EU 
members major trading partners. Applying ordinary least-squares (OLS) analysis to the 
gravity model of bilateral trade, we will test to see if being a member of the Euro-zone is 
an expedient to trade.1 Data includes export value, gross domestic product (GDP), 
population, and the bilateral distance between the principal cities of the twenty-three 
industrialized countries as classified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Before 
we look at the empirical evidence we will briefly review the history of free trade and the 
economic benefits and shortcomings of both regional trading agreements and currency 
unions. Following the analysis of the data we will look at the policy implications of our 
findings.
21.2 Free Trade-a Historical Overview
The theory that the overall welfare benefits of free trade are greater than
protection is one of the most widely accepted economic propositions. From Adam Smith
to modem economists, free trade has survived continued scrutiny. A definition o f ‘free
trade’ is in order. In the context of this paper, ‘free trade’ will mean the flow of goods
and services across nation boundaries without artificial restrictions. Thus, the price paid
by consumers and producers reflects the ‘world’ price. These prices reflect the relative
scarcity of goods and resources and allow consumers and producers to consider the
opportunity cost of economic activities.
1 Welfare Effects of Free Trade
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It is easy to see graphically, as shown in Figure 1, that overall there is a gain in 
welfare from free trade. US consumers gain an increased supply at lower prices and Rest 
of the World producers gain increased prices for an increased volume of bikes.
3Little in the way of a state policy towards trade was developed prior to Smith. 
Writers prior to the seventeenth century were more concerned with ethical and other 
related concerns. Economic issues were secondary considerations (Irwin 1996). Ancient 
writers and philosophers view of trade depended on their relationship to the sea and their 
view of it. Plutarch (100 AD) considered goods obtained through trade as beneficial to 
man (Irwin 1996). Horace (50 BC) viewed the sea as bringing unwanted contact with 
strangers (Irwin 1996). Generally, Greek and Roman philosophers were skeptical of 
merchants and traders.
Early Christians, following the lead of the earlier Greeks and Romans, viewed 
economics as a branch of ethics. Taking their cue from biblical text, they viewed 
merchants and traders as risking their souls with the temptations of covetousness, lying, 
cheating, and fraud. Irwin (1996) points out that although the Christians shared with the 
Greeks and Romans concerns with the moral aspects of trade, they were interested not in 
cultural autonomy but with spreading their religious and moral values around the world. 
In addition, the Christians distinguished between improving a good by adding value and 
merely selling the same good for a higher price.
Counter to the mistrust of trade and commerce by the Christian and Graeco- 
Roman thinkers, was the doctrine of universal economy. Developed by philosophers and 
theologians in the early centuries AD, the doctrine promoted the notion that resources and 
goods were distributed unequally around the world by Providence to promote commerce. 
Viner (1996) describes four elements to the doctrine: it embraces the stoic-cosmopolitan 
belief in the universal brotherhood of man; it describes the benefits of trade to mankind;
4it recognizes that resources are unequally scattered around the world; and it attributes this 
arrangement to divine providence as a means of promoting trade and cooperation among 
men. Viner adds: “ . . .  the doctrine . . .  has claims to be the oldest and longest-lived 
[economic] doctrine we know o f . . ( 1 9 9 1 ) .
The doctrine of universal economy continued to be espoused to the case of free 
trade. Both mercantilists and free traders alike adopted it. The mercantilists, however, 
used it to promote their own particular point of view. It became a part of natural law 
teachings and those of the cosmopolitan doctrine of the enlightenment (Irwin 1996). 
Although the doctrine of universal economy clearly recognized the advantages of free 
trade, the non-economic effects of trade made free trade generally undesirable to most 
writers prior to the seventeenth century.
Medieval scholars continued to be skeptical of trade and commerce. Traders were 
generally connected to fraud and other sins because the pursuit of gain led to temptations 
that endangered one’s soul (Irwin 1996). Individuals that produced goods from their 
labor were held in higher regard. St. Thomas Aquinas began the shift of recognizing the 
usefulness of traders and merchants to society. Although accepting the necessity of trade 
by recognizing that some goods and commodities could be produced more efficiently 
elsewhere, Aquinas felt that locally produced goods were superior because they promoted 
self-sufficiency. Goods that were in short supply, however, could be provided through 
trade.
Economic thought continued to evolve through the middle ages. Writers began to 
view commerce as an ethically neutral activity with only the potential for corruption.
5Later theologians were divided on the issue. John Calvin recognized the benefits of trade
but cautioned against its risks:
“ . . .  as it most frequently happens that abundance leads to pride and cruelty . . .  
in that merchandise which is carried on with distant and foreign nations, there is 
often a large amount of tricks and dishonesty, and no limit set on the desire of 
gain.”2
Martin Luther on the other hand held the view that countries should be more than content 
with domestically produced goods. Little good came of commerce he concluded.
Increased commercial activity in the seventeenth century necessitated the 
rethinking of philosophies on commerce. Building on Aquinas’s concept of ‘natural 
law’, which used human reasoning to interpret the divine plan of what is right and wrong, 
the natural law philosophers prescribed a code of moral and judicial conduct that was 
proper in the pursuit of commercial activity. Applying ‘natural law’ to the relationships 
between states, the writers developed the ‘law of nations’. Most endorsed the idea that 
because not all regions were endowed with equal resources, trade was necessary and 
states could not restrict trade. In the event that one nation restricted trade, others had the 
right to go to war to secure free access. As the ‘law of nations’ evolved it was applied to 
exceptions regulating trade. The right of nations to trade was transformed to the right of 
nations to regulate their trade.
Contemporary to the ‘natural law’ writers were the mercantilists. Rather than 
being theologians and philosophers, the mercantilists tended to be merchants, government 
officials, and other individuals who were interested in promoting a cause for their own 
personal gain. The mercantilists wrote at a time, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
that saw vast expansion of overseas trade and exploration and the rise of nation-states as
6political entities (Irwin 1996). Most mercantilist literature was in the form of pamphlets, 
with English writers being the most prolific and pertinent to trade issues. The 
mercantilists were primarily interested in maintaining a favorable balance of trade, 
believing that the wealth of a nation was measured in its holdings of specie (gold and 
silver).
Specie was necessary for making the transactions involved in trade and as security 
in times of war. Consequently a favorable balance of trade, where exports exceeded 
imports, meant that a nation would be accumulating stocks of specie. By extension, it 
was advantageous to protect import competing industries and commodities with tariffs 
and provide state assistance to exporting industries. Domestic commerce was often 
dismissed as not contributing to the wealth of the nation. While domestic trade only 
enriched the individuals involved, foreign trade increased the nations wealth.
The emergence of the nation-state brought political boundaries to trade policy.
The mercantilists framed their debate in the context of political and economic rivalries. 
Trade was carried on in the framework of a fixed volume of trade. One country benefited 
at the expense of another. Mercantilists advocated the regulation of trade that benefited 
the nation particularly if the regulation benefited the industry in which the writer was 
involved!
Gradually, the necessity for two-way trade began to be recognized. If an 
importing country couldn’t in turn sell its goods abroad how could it buy another 
country’s goods? By the end of the seventeenth century, doubts were raised about a 
positive trade balance being a good measure of winning or losing at trade (Irwin 1996).
7It became a common mercantilist theme to advocate policies that promoted the 
exportation of manufactured goods and the importation of raw commodities. A 
commercial policy began to develop that placed high import duties on manufactured 
goods and low duties on raw materials. Mercantilists supported commercial (economic 
development) policies that promoted manufacturing.
Free trade thought began to emerge as a challenge to the goals and concerns of the 
mercantilists and to question the role of the state in economic affairs and international 
trade in particular. Principal among the eighteenth century writers was Adam Smith. His 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations published in 1776,3 was 
one of the first comprehensive and certainly most notable works on economic thought. 
Smith was able to “ . . .  present a systematic, coherent framework for thinking about the 
economics of trade policy” (Irwin 1996).
The bulk of Smith’s writing on trade policy is in Book IV, “Of System’s of 
Political Oeconomy.” Smith identified the object of mercantilist policy as “ . . .  to 
diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home-consumption, 
and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestick industry” 
(IV.i. 15). Smith was interested in the economy wide impact of commercial policy.
While acknowledging that the mercantilist policy of protecting domestic manufactures 
via tariffs encouraged expanded domestic production, Smith theorized that “ . . .  whether 
it tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the most 
advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident” (IV.ii.2).
8Smith framed his argument around the notion that: “Every individual is 
continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever 
capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which 
he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads 
him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to society” (IV.ii.4). [Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’ (IV.ii.9).]
Smith argued the importance of assessing the ‘opportunity costs’ or trade off 
between alternative policies. Government regulation “ . .. can only divert a part of it 
[societal capital] into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by 
no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the 
society than that into which it would have gone of its oVrn accord” (IV.ii.3).
Applying these ideas to trade policy, Smith reasoned that a society was best 
served by employing its resources in ways in which it was at an advantage and trading 
another country for those goods in which it had an advantage. “If a foreign country can 
supply us with a commodity cheaper than ourselves can make it, better buy it of them 
with some part of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some 
advantage” (IV.ii. 12).
Smith concluded that mercantilist policy, although encouraging domestic 
economic progress, diminished national welfare with distorted economic policies that 
misallocated resources. National welfare was best served by policies, including trade, 
which allowed individuals to direct their efforts to their own advantage.
9The Wealth o f Nations was followed in the early nineteenth century with a 
plethora of works by a group of intellectual economists known as the classical 
economists. Writers such as James Mill (1773-1836), David Riccardo (1772-1823), 
Robert Torrens (1818-84), Robert Malthus (1766-1834), J. B. Say (1767-1832), James 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and Nassau Senior (1790-1864) expanded on Smith’s ideas.4
Ricardo is credited with developing the theory of comparative costs and was a 
chief opponent of the British Com Laws.5 Mill staunchly advocated free trade (Irwin 
1996). J. S. Mill, James Mill’s son, argued against protection for domestic producers and 
illustrated the increased welfare effects with international specialization and trade. 
Malthus famous for his views on population joined the debate on the Com Laws opposite 
Ricarrdo. Torrens, along with Mill, saw the advantage of letting trade determine the most 
efficient use of resources.
Support for free trade in the early part of the nineteenth century was not 
unanimous. As noted above, Malthus advocated an agriculture policy that protected 
agriculture and the British land owning class. Other writers found exceptions to 
unilateral free trade. Torrens modified his position of advocating free trade to one in 
which a country was justified in imposing a tariff to equalize the terms of trade between 
two countries. Torrens’s arguments elicited considerable debate from most of his 
contemporaries, principally Nassau Senior.
J. S. Mill brought support to Torrens’ argument in his Essays on Some Unsettled 
Questions o f Political Economy. Mill, as well as Torrens, acknowledged however that 
while improving a country’s terms of trade, import tariffs reduced world welfare overall.
10
Additionally, Mill gave qualified support to the ‘infant industry’ argument (1848).6 
Mill’s position elicited considerable criticism from his contemporaries. Alfred Marshall 
(1842-1924), considered one of the leading economists of the next generation, added 
credibility to the infant industry argument by writing: “ . .. protection to immature 
industries is a very great national good. . . ” (1903). The infant industry argument was 
used well into the twentieth century as justification for the imposition of tariffs (Irwin
1996).
A final assault to free trade thinking from an influential economist came from 
John Maynard Keynes. Writing in the context of the collapse of the world economy in 
the 1930’s, Keynes advocated using import tariffs as a means of stimulating domestic 
production and relieving high unemployment. Initially a free trader, Keynes modified his 
views in an attempt to relieve chronically high rates of unemployment in 1920’s Britain. 
British monetary policy at the time tied sterling to gold. British producers, exporters and 
import-competing, were at a competitive disadvantage. The tight monetary policy of the 
British government depressed domestic output and employment (Irwin 1996).
Keynes proposed several solutions to combat the economic crises that became the 
Great Depression, among which was the call for import tariffs. This seemed the most 
feasible since other policy measures were deemed too impractical. Although believing 
that protectionist policies would be harmful in the long run, the worsening crises 
convinced Keynes that protectionist measures should be implemented (Keynes 1981). 
Keynes saw three remedies for increasing employment and business activity: devaluation, 
nominal wage reductions, and import tariffs.
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Keynes’ proposals were met with considerable criticism. Lionel Robbins, a 
fellow member of the Economic Advisory Council to the British government was sharply 
critical and maintained that a tariff would not alleviate unemployment and would incite 
foreign protectionists (Hoekman and Kostecki 1996). Keynes stature as an economist 
lent legitimacy to protectionist policies up until the 1970’s when stagflation proved 
Keynesian policies ineffective.7
The end of WWII brought a different perspective to the free trade argument.
At the end of the war policy planners set about establishing mechanisms that would help 
prevent breakdowns in the world economic structure such as those that led to the Great 
Depression and WWII.
1.3 GATT & WTO
One of those mechanisms was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Established in 1947, the GATT was to be a forum in which trade disputes could 
be resolved before they escalated into full fledge trade wars. The GATT was an interim 
agreement reached by negotiators after the US failed to ratify the more formal 
International Trade Organization (ITO). The GATT had no institutional structure but 
was an inter-governmental treaty (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995). The goal of the GATT 
was to raise standards of living, ensure full employment, develop the frill resources of the 
world, and expand the production and exchange of goods. Furthermore, it was a goal to 
reduce, in a mutually agreeable and advantageous manner, tariffs and other barriers to 
trade.
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By the 1990’s the GATT had evolved into a de facto world trade organization 
with a complex set of codes and arrangements, interpretations, waivers, reports and 
Council of Representative decisions (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995).8 Technically, the 
GATT Secretariat came under the auspices of the United Nation.
Eight rounds of negotiations were held under GATT: the Geneva round (1947), 
the Annecy round (1949), the Torquay round (1951), Geneva again in 1956, the Dillon 
round (1960-61), the Kennedy round (1964-67), the Tokyo round (1973-79) and the 
Uruguay round (1986-94). The first five rounds dealt with tariffs. With the Kennedy 
round, attention shifted to non-tariff restrictions and agricultural trade. The Tokyo round 
dealt with product standards and government procurement, issues not subject to GATT. 
The Uruguay round expanded to include trade in services, intellectual property, and rules 
of origin (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995).
In 1990, Canada, backed by the EC, proposed a Multilateral Trade Organization 
(MTO). A single body with an institutional framework was needed to encompass all 
agreements and arrangements concluded to that point as well as to include the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade-related intellectual property rights 
(TRIPs).9 Originally opposed by the United States, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) became a formal institution in 1995. There was little change in the status quo 
from GATT since most of the institutional framework already existed. The WTO has 
equal status with the IMF and World Bank.
The WTO has five functions: facilitating the implementation and operation of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements; providing a forum for the negotiations on already
13
covered or new issues; administering the Understanding on dispute settlement and the 
Trade Policies Review Mechanism (TPRM); and co-operating with World Bank and the 
IMF to achieve greater coherence in global economic policy making (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 1995).
The WTO provides a framework for the settlement of trade disputes. Although 
largely codifying existing GATT practices the WTO provides a more timely, automatic 
and binding mechanism. Disputes not resolved through direct negotiations between 
contending parties can be brought before a panel of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
Appointed by the WTO Secretariat, the three member panels gather information from the 
disputing parties and make a recommendation to the DSB. If the offending country fails 
to enact the recommendations of the DSB in a ‘reasonable period of time’, the 
complainant can suspend concessions or retaliate (Hoekman and Koestecki 1995). From 
1948 to 1990, of the 120 disputes brought to GATT, 60 led to panel reports and of those 
60, only four were not adopted (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995). The WTO should have at 
least as good a track record if not better.
In spite of compelling evidence in support of free trade and the gains made under 
the GATT, free trade and the WTO are not without their distracters. In November of 
1999, opponents of free trade and the WTO virtually shut down what was to be the 
opening of a new round of negotiations. Protesters of various persuasions disrupted 
ministerial level negotiations that were to address issues left over from the Uruguay 
round, mainly agriculture and services. The WTO is seen as an agent for big companies’ 
global ambitions at the expense of jobs and the environment (The Economist 1999).
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2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Preferential Trading Agreements
In spite of economic evidence that they are a ‘second-best’ alternative to free 
trade, the number of preferential trading agreements (PTA), subject to GATT Article 
XXIV grew from one in 1947 to more than 100 in 1994 (Baghwati and Phangariya
1996).10 At the same time, ad valorem (percent of value) tariff level fell from 40 percent 
in 1948 to around 3 percent in 1998 (Freund 1998). Researchers have extensively 
explored the economics and politics of PTA’s. Conclusions vary.
PTA’s take many forms from most-favored nation (MFN) to full economic 
integration. Most-favored-nation agreements are special trade concessions granted to a 
trading partner that are equal to agreements with a third nation. MFN arrangements as 
formal trade policy can be traced to the beginning of the nineteenth century (Promfret
1997). The GATT established MFN as a basic policy subject to exceptions of Article 
XXIV. Other arrangements are: free trade areas (FTA) where members grant 100% 
reciprocal tariff reductions to each other member while retaining discriminatory tariffs 
against non-members; customs unions set a common set of trade policies towards non­
members; a common market expands the free movement of goods and services to include 
factors of production (labor and capital); and an economic union seeks to coordinate 
economic policy including monetary and tax policy.
The welfare implications of PTA’s are subject to debate. Krugman (1991) 
demonstrates with a simple numerical example that PTA’s can be either welfare reducing 
or welfare increasing depending on the starting point of the member countries (Box l).11
15
Box 1: A Hypothetical Example of A Free Trade Area
Imagine that country A can produce wheat for itself, import it 
from B or import from C. The cost of producing a bushel of wheat in 
A is 10. The cost of wheat bought from B is 8. And the cost of wheat 
bought from C is 5.
Tariff Rate
0 4 6
Cost of Wheat From: 
A 10 10 10
B, before customs union 8 12 14
B, after customs union 8 8 8
C 5 9 11
Suppose initially that A has a tariff that applies to all imported 
wheat. If it imports wheat in spite of the tariff it will buy it from the 
cheapest source, C. This case is illustrated by column Tariff Rate = 4. 
If the tariff is high enough, i.e. Tariff Rate = 6, A will grow its own 
wheat.
Now suppose that A enters a custom union with B, so that 
wheat from B can enter free of tariff. Does this increase A’s welfare or 
not?
If the tariff was initially 6, the customs union is a good thing. A 
will replace its expensive domestic wheat, priced at 10 for cheaper 
wheat from B (8). It can then use its resources to produce those things 
in which it is most productive. If, however, the tariff was initially 4, 
the customs union will cause A to shift from importing from C the low 
cost producer to higher priced wheat from B. In which case, welfare 
may be reduced by the customs union.
Source: Krugman (1991)
A similar result can be demonstrated graphically. Following Bhagwati and 
Panagariya (1999), the potential for a PTA to be either welfare increasing or reducing is 
shown in Figure 2. For three countries, A, B, and C, A and B are potential union partners 
and C is any third country with which A trades. In 2a. and 2b., MaMa represents A’s 
import demand for some product or commodity. P\Xb and Pc Xc represents the supplies
16
(export) of the same product available from B and C respectively. In 2a., the price of B,
Pb is less than that of C, Pc. In 2b., the opposite is true. In both cases, following Viner’s
partial equilibrium, model prices are considered constant.
Figure 2a. illustrates the case of a trade-creating union with a non-discriminatory
tariff t. A imports quantity OMo of the product. All imports come from B, the low cost
producer, so that A raises areas 1+2 in tariff revenue. A now forms a PTA with B.
Imports increase from OM0to OMfc. The tariff revenue to A is now gone, but the price
to consumers in A drops by t. A’s consumers gain the entire surplus. The union acts like
*
non-discriminatory free trade and A and the union has a net gain in trade represented by 
areas 3 and 4.
Figure 2b. illustrates a trade-diverting union. In this case Pb is higher than Pc. 
With tariff, t in A all imports come from C. A imports OMo and collects tariff revenue 
shown by areas 1 and 2. When A and B form a PTA imports expand to OMfta but all 
supply switches from C to B. Some trade is created by the lowering of the price to A’s 
consumers, but the switch to the higher priced producer from C causes trade diversion of 
MO0 from C to B. The gains to A are shown by area 3 and the losses by 2. Unless the 
price difference between B and C is small the welfare loss to A will exceed any gains 
from the trade created. The gains to a country from increased trade can be substantial. 
Estimates by Frankel and Rose “ . . .  suggest that every one percent increase in trade 
(relative to GDP) raises income per capita 1/3 of a percent over a 20-year period, and 
substantially more over the long run” (2000).
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Figure 2
2a. Trade-creating Union of A and B
Effects on the Union 
1+2=Tariff Revenue Loss to A 
1+2+3+4=Gain in Surplus to A 
3+4=Net Gain to A=Trade Creation 
Xc
2b. Trade-diverting Union of A and B
Effects on the Union
1+2=Tariff Revenue Loss to A
1+3=Gain in Surplus to A
3-2=Gain or Loss to A=Trade Gain or Loss
0 Mo
Source: Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999)
If evidence proves the welfare-reducing nature of discriminatory trade practices 
and the GATT and now WTO provide a forum in which to resolve trade disputes why 
have they continued to proliferate? Pomffet (1997) offers four explanations: extension of 
non-discriminatory trade arguments, bargaining motives, political motives, and gains to
exporters.
18
Several of the arguments in support of non-discriminatory trade policies can be 
adapted to discriminatory practices. First, a large country can use its market share to 
improve its terms of trade by imposing import restrictions. A large country may be able 
to implement discriminatory tariffs depending on the elasticities of its importers. By 
doing so it will be able to increase revenues above that of a single optimum tariff.
The possibility of increased tariff revenue is another argument used in support of 
PTA’s. The increase in the geographical size of a trading area may increase the 
administrative costs of trade as well as the GNP of the combined area. The larger area 
initially may see a rise in their tariff revenues. Tariff revenues appear to decline over 
time, however (Pomfret 1997).
The protection of domestic industry is viewed as the primary motive for 
establishing a PTA. If foreign producers are seen as an industry’s primary competitors, 
then import restrictions are seen as an effective way of securing an advantage to domestic 
producers. Alternative sources or comparable substitutes, however, soon render the 
restrictions ineffective. Still, countries are able to negotiate bilateral trade agreements 
under GATT and can target specific industries. An extension of this argument is to 
protect an ‘infant industry’. As discussed above, the infant industry argument has long 
been a point in the free trade debate. Countries at a competitive disadvantage in the 
market often choose to protect an industry until it can ‘mature’ either through economies 
of scale or efficiencies gained through experience. Competition, not protection, over 
time is usually the best means of increasing efficiencies. Protected industries want to 
remain protected.
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Additionally, during the 1980’s the argument was made that protecting domestic 
firms was a way of increasing their market share against monopolistic competition. 
Finally, national security is often used as a reason to protect certain suppliers or 
industries. This part of the argument can be extended to regional security arrangements, 
as well.
Another main argument for discriminatory trade practices is the gains to the 
protected exporters. In reciprocal arrangements like a customs union, each member will 
be a favored exporter of something and the union’s terms of trade will increase in 
relationship to the rest of the world.
Next, if a country’s tariff levels are independent of another country’s tariffs, a 
country has an incentive to level an optimal tariff. The bargaining strength of a country 
depends on its optimum tariff level. The higher the optimum rate the more interested a 
country’s trading partners will be in negotiating to keep the tariff below the optimum rate 
(Pomfret 1997). Bargaining by a large country offering special treatment to a small 
country is likely to be the most successful.
Lastly and probably most importantly, are the political motivations of trade 
policies. Discriminatory trade policies alter the patterns of trade, resulting in gains to the 
favored and losses to the discriminated against. The formation of the EC was a political 
exercise with the customs union effects as reinforcement.
Large countries are more likely to use political motives in granting preferential 
treatment to smaller countries. The economic gains to large country may be small but 
they could be significant to the smaller country. Political motives most likely are to gain
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or maintain a sphere of influence within a region. Trade policy becomes foreign policy. 
Sanctions are sometimes used as a foreign policy tool. However, sanctions are rarely 
effective. Trade considerations seldom influence an entrenched government (Cuba for 
example) and sanctions give rise to free-riders taking advantage of the increased 
favorable terms of trade and finding ways to skirt the blockade.
Other considerations, other than those suggested by Pomfret, for the formation of 
PTA’s are geographical proximity and historical trade patterns. The cost of trade 
between neighbors is often lower due to decreased transportation costs. Familiarity with 
products and customs are also incentives to do business. Regional cooperation then 
becomes attractive. Historical connections such as colonial influences are often used to 
explain trade patterns (Rose 2000).
What influence does membership in a PTA have on the pattern of trade? Studies 
abound.12 Frankel (1997) finds that for the EU, members trade 35% more than similar 
non-members. For other blocs such as NAFTA, Frankel (1997) shows a coefficient of 
0.36 for a 43% increase in trade (e°36 = 1.43). For MECOSUR,13 the coefficient was 
1.92 in 1990 (Frankel 1997, Table 4.2) for an almost seven (e192 = 6.81) times increase in 
trade. Two Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries trade six times 
(e177 = 5.85) more than two similar non-Asian countries (Frankel 1997, Table 4.2).14 
Freund (1998) found that EU members traded one and a half times (e0 42 = 1.52) more 
with each other in 1990 than with non-members. Generally, membership in a PTA has a 
positive influence in trade volume between members. The magnitude being a function of 
varying factors.
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2.2 The European Union
All of which brings us to a discussion of the EU,15 the PTA that is the focus of our 
study. The years immediately following WWII saw a concerted effort by Western 
Europe towards cooperation. Spurred on by the United States to equitably distribute the 
aid from the Marshall Plan and by the military threat posed by the Soviet Union, Western 
Europe began to take the steps that led to the EU. The need to resolve the ‘German 
problem’ also played a role in European cooperation.
The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was set up in 
1947 to distribute the Marshall Plan aid. Although the aid program was over in three 
years, the OEEC proved to be a forum in which to discuss economic co-operation and 
trade issues. The OEEC was expanded in 1961 to include all advanced non-communist 
industrialized nations, becoming the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).16 In reaction to the take over of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet 
Union in 1948, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg formed the Western European Union (WEU). Largely superceded by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Treaty of Brussels called for 
collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defense.
The disastrous effects of the isolation of Germany following WWI could not be 
repeated. The desire to keep Germany in a perpetual state of economic backwardness 
was overruled by the need to use Germany (West Germany at least) as a buffer to the 
expanding Soviet Union. The solution was to intertwine Germany so intrinsically with its 
neighbors that another European war would be impossible. Europe would gain not only a
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German military presence for the defense of Europe but Germany’s natural resources 
would be available to a recovering Europe.
Conflict between France and Germany over the Saarland, the rich iron and coal 
region of Germany led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). Italy and the Benelux Union joined France and Germany in the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris.17 The UK was notably absent from the ECSC having been invited to join but 
declining membership. The six ECSC members formed the European Defense 
Community (EDC) in 1952,18 but the French National Assembly failed to ratify the 
treaty. In 1957, the six ECSC countries signed treaties in Rome to establish the European 
Economic Community (EEC) which was to establish a common market and the European 
Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom). The three-ECSC, EEC, and Euratom-joined in 
1967, to form the European Community (EC). Strongly influenced by the French 
president Charles de Gaulle and West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the EC got 
off to a great start. Intra-community trade increased an average of 28.4% annually for the 
first ten years (Leonard 2000). The goals of removing internal tariffs and the 
establishment of a common external tariff were met ahead of schedule. In addition, a 
common agricultural policy (CAP) was adopted in 1962. De Gaulle had effectively 
blocked entry into the EC by the UK, considering the UK’s first priorities were to the 
United States, but after his death in 1970, Denmark, Ireland, and the UK gained 
membership to the EC in 1972. Norway narrowly rejected accession in 1972. Greece 
entered the community in 1981 with Portugal and Spain joining in 1986.
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The European Monetary System (EMS) became effective in March of 1979. The 
EMS was established as a means of stabilizing currency fluctuations within the EC. 
Additionally, membership in the EMS provided other benefits. A stable currency 
removes much of the uncertainty in cross border transactions. Johnson (1998) estimates a 
savings of 0.3% of GDP in transaction costs with the single currency. Reducing and 
controlling inflation is another benefit to membership. Stable prices help countries 
maintain competitiveness. Investors are more willing to invest if they are assured the 
value of their investments will be maintained.
The European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF) and a common currency unit 
(the ecu) backed the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the EC. Under the ERM, each 
participating currency (of the nine members only the UK opted out) had an exchange rate 
pegged to the ecu. A currency could be realigned (given a new rate) by mutual 
agreement of the participating countries if it stayed too long at a ‘ceiling’ or ‘floor’ level. 
Bilateral rates were then calculated around the central rate. Currencies were allowed to 
fluctuate +/- 2.5 % around the central rate (Leonard 2000).
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed transforming the EC into the European 
Union (EU).19 The Maastricht Treaty set up a timetable for achieving economic and 
monetary union and set up the protocol for the establishment of EC institutions. Once 
again the UK opted out.
In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden became full members of the EU. By this 
time it was apparent that the EU was on track to implement its plan of a single currency.
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January 1,1999 was set as the target date. Convergence requirements for accession to 
the Euro-zone are:
♦ A country’s inflation rate should, over the previous year, not have exceeded 
by more than 1.5% that achieved by an average of the three best performing 
states.
♦ Its currency had been in the narrow band of the ERM for at least the preceding 
two years and had not been devalued during that period.
♦ Its long-term interest rates had not exceeded by more than 2% over the 
preceding year the average of the three best-performing states so far as price 
stability is concerned.
♦ It was not subject to a decision of the council that it was running an excessive 
budget deficit (Leonard 2000).
Of the EU-15, Greece and Sweden were excluded from the single currency because of its 
failure to meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and the UK and Denmark opted 
out. As of January 1, 1999, the euro became operational. Coins and currency won’t be 
issued until 2002 when the national currencies will be withdrawn.
In 1999, the EC-15 had a combined population of 375 million with GDP of 
$8,491 billion. Its 1999 export volume was $432.2 billion of which 79% was intrabloc. 
The EU-15 is the second largest economy in the world after the US. Table 1 illustrates 
the importance of trade to the EU.
25
Table 1 % Trade EU and Industrialized Countries
1987 1992 1997 1999
% of Trade EU to 
Industrialized Countries
81.6 77.5 76.4 79.0
% of Trade
Industrialized Countries to 
World
76.3 74.0 70.0 72.9
2.3 Currency Unions
The establishment of a currency union between two countries or by a PTA adds a 
new factor to the equation of international trade. For the purposes of this project, a 
currency union will mean an agreement between two or more countries to share a 
common currency. Other exchange rate mechanisms such as pegging and currency 
boards, although designed to minimize exchange rate fluctuations, are less stringent than 
sharing a common currency. Sharing a common currency implies sharing a common 
monetary policy as well. In addition to the Euro-zone, Rose (2000) identified 92 
countries belonging to seventeen currency unions in the period 1970-1990. Twenty-nine 
of the 92 countries are dependencies or territories. Most currency unions involve small 
countries. The Euro-zone is unique in that it involves a group of industrialized countries.
Why establish a currency union? Proponents tout benefits such as increased 
central bank credibility, inflation control, and expanded capital markets. All of which 
tend to raise productivity and output. Without question increasing trade is a primary 
motive. Undeniably, a single currency facilitates trade by reducing transaction costs. 
Increased trade has a number of ramifications: synchronization of business cycles, 
increased competition for factors of production, a general strengthening of political ties, 
and of course greater consumer welfare inside the union (Rose 2000).
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Economic studies have found little effect on trade from reduced exchange rate 
volatility (Rose 2000).20 Critics of single currency areas point out that most exchange 
rate risk is accounted for by the use of forward contracts. Therefore, the main argument 
for a single currency, that of eliminating exchange rate fluctuations, is irrelevant. Few 
studies exist, however, that have looked at the effects of a currency union on trade 
(Frankel and Wei 1998; Frankel and Rose 2000; and Rose2000). Rose (2000) and 
Frankel and Rose (2000) both found that membership in a currency union increased intra­
union trade by three times.
Mancera (1991) differentiates between the general characteristics of several types 
of currency areas. First, there is a currency union in which a country or countries peg 
their currencies to that of a reference currency. This is usually informal and unilateral. 
Several advantages arise to the country that pegs its exchange rate to a reference 
currency. Certain conditions need to be met: the referencing countries purchasing power 
should be relatively stable; prices and income (real and nominal) should be flexible; the 
reference country is a major trading partner or the pegging country uses the reference 
currency in most of its international transactions; there are no serious obstacles to 
international merchandise movements; the pegging country is not overly exposed to 
external shocks; and finally maintaining the peg is an actual possibility.
Given the reference currency’s stability and the pegs sustainability, the pegging 
country can expect several benefits: the country’s inflation rate should converge to that of 
the reference currency; the risk in international transactions should be reduced which in 
turn increases economic certainty and confidence, both ingredients in economic growth.
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A second type of currency area is one in which exchange rates are fixed or 
allowed to fluctuate within a band by treaty. The rates are revisable and backed by a 
system of reciprocal credit. The European Monetary system’s ERM was such a regime. 
In exchange for the loss of exchange rate flexibility, member countries gain the combined 
credit resources to support their exchange rates in cases of temporary disequilibria. 
Coordinated fiscal and monetary policies further increase stability.
Closer policy coordination is required by exchange rate regimes in which rates are 
permanently fixed. This type of currency area requires virtually the same policy 
coordination that would be required by adopting a single currency. However, since 
domestic currencies would continue to circulate, some of the efficiencies of a single 
currency would be lost.
Finally, there is the currency area, such as the Euro-zone, in which its members 
adopt a single currency. There are profound implications to the adoption of a single 
currency. It is necessary for the member countries to cede their monetary authority to an 
independent central bank. As discussed below, monetary and fiscal policy tools are lost 
to individual members. On the other hand member states gain the combined credit 
resources of the union, savings in transaction costs and unfettered access to a larger 
market.
Critics counter that a single currency is not the cure all. A single currency among 
dissimilar economies removes numerous tools from policymakers’ toolboxes. A shared 
monetary policy curtails an individual member country from responding to economic 
conditions unique to it. Demand shocks must be similar and factors of production need to
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be highly mobile between countries of a currency zone. Exchange rate flexibility, which 
is lost in a currency zone, is another policy tool that is viewed as necessary for 
responding to changes in economic conditions. Additionally, political questions must be 
answered. For example, how much independence should a central bank have? What 
form of governance should it have? To whom is it accountable?
2.4 The European Monetary Union
The EMU’s transformation to a single currency union has been guided by 
institutions and policies set in place by the Maastricht Treaty. The Protocols on the 
Statue o f the European System o f Central Banks and o f the European Central Bank went 
into effect on November 1, 1993.21 In order to conduct the single monetary policy and 
for the creation of a single currency, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was 
established. Its goal was to strengthen central bank cooperation and monetary policy 
coordination and to make the preparations required for the establishment of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB). With the appointment of the President, Vice-President 
and four members of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB) on June 
1, 1998, the ECB was established and the EMI ceased to exist. On January 1,1999 the 
exchange rates of the eleven EMU states that met the convergence criteria were fixed and 
a single monetary policy became the responsibility of the ECB.
The main objective of the ECB is price stability. This is to be accomplished by 
defining “ . . .  a prominent role for money, as signaled by the quantitative reference 
value for the growth of a broad monetary aggregate; and a broadly based assessment of
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the outlook for price developments and risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole” 
(ECB 2001a).
In addition, the ESCB or Euro-system is:
♦ to define and implement the monetary policy of the euro area;
♦ to conduct foreign exchange operations;
♦ to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States; and
♦ to promote the smooth operation of payment systems (ECB 2001b)
Table 2 Conversion rates for the euro
€ 1= 13.7603 Austrian schillings
40.3399 Belgian francs
40.3399 Luxembourg francs
1.95583 German marks
166.386 Spanish pesetas
5.94573 Finnish markkaa
0.7877564 Irish pounds
1,936.27 Italian lire
2.20371 Dutch gilders
200.782 Portuguese escudos
340.750 Greek drachma
Source: Leonard (2000); ECB (2001)
How can the benefits of membership in a currency union be measured? The 
gravity model of bilateral trade has demonstrated its reliability in predicting trade flows 
and the effects of various factors on the volume of bilateral trade. This model will be 
applied to determine what influence membership in the euro-zone has on trade.
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3.0 Empirical Data and Method
3.1 The gravity model of bilateral trade
The gravity model of bilateral trade provides the framework for analyzing the 
data. In its most basic form, Xij=a0YialYja2Dija3 the gravity model says that the volume of 
trade (Xy), between country i and country j  is proportional to the product of GDP* ( Yj) 
and GDPj (Yj) and to the distance (Dy) between them. Any number of other explanatory 
variables can be added, such as measurements in size: population or per capita GDP as in 
this project, and land areas. Additionally, dummy variables that measure geographical or 
cultural similarities, such as common language, colonial relationships, common borders, 
or membership in regional trading agreements are often included.
The model for this project transformed to log form for OLS analysis is specified 
by the following equation:
log(Xij) = a + /;log(GDP, GDPy) + ^ 2log(GDP/popi GDP/pop;)
+^log(DISTy) +^(ADJy) +/j(LANG(/)
+ yj(EUij) + y2 (CRy) + YiCEURO,) + e9 (1)
The variables are defined as follows: Xy is the value of exports from country i to country j
measured in millions of USS; GDP is gross domestic product, measured in billions of
US$; POP is population in millions; DIST is the great circle distance between the major
cities in i and j  in miles. ADJ is a dummy variable indicating common borders. 1 if i and
j  share a common border, 0 otherwise. LANG is a dummy variable denoting a common
language. 1 if z and j  share a common language, 0 otherwise. CR, EU and EURO are
dummy variables representing membership in a common geographical region, the EU and
Euro-zone respectively. 1 if a member, 0 otherwise, e is an error term.
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The gravity model of bilateral trade has gained recent credibility in international 
economics. Frankel (1997) gives three reasons for the model’s revival: its empirical 
success at predicting trade flows; modem theories of trade in imperfect substitutes 
supporting its theoretical foundations; interest by economists in the role of geography and 
trade. Early applications of the model to trade flows were done by Tinbergen (1962) and 
Poyhonen (1963). Linnemann (1966) added extensively to Tinbergen with the addition 
of more variables.
Frankel (1997) credits regional economists and urban sociologists with using the 
model by name as far back as 1946. Frankel (1997) goes on to equate the trade model to 
Isaac Newton’s gravitational model which states ‘the attraction between two heavenly 
models is proportional to the product of their masses and inversely related to them’.
3.2 Theoretical Foundations
Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) applied early versions of the gravity 
model to bilateral trade flows. Linnemann (1966) expanded on Tinbergens model by 
adding more variables. The gravity model owed its legitimacy to its empirical success. 
Little in the way of theoretical justification was offered (Deardorff 1998). Trade theory 
was based on the H-0 factors proportion theory. The H-0 theory predicts that countries 
export products that use their abundant factors of production (capital, labor) most. 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) applied the notion that the volume of trade depended on 
the products of the trading countries output (GDP). Bergstrand (1985) derived a gravity 
equation from a general equilibrium model. Bergstrand (1989) extended his earlier work 
by incorporating factor endowment variables (H-O) and taste preferences (Linder)22 into
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the analysis. Deardorff (1998) showed that the gravity model could be derived from a 
‘frictionless’ H-0 model of homogeneous products and one of differentiated products. 
Deardorff concludes: “ . . .  it is not all that difficult to justify. . .  simple forms of the 
gravity equation from standard trade theory” (1998).
3.3 The Variables
The dependent variable in the gravity model is the value of exports between 
country / and country j. In our model we will use exports from i to j  measured in millions 
of US$. Figures are taken from the Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook (DOTSY), 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is common to use gross 
aggregate trade, exports plus imports (Bergstrand 1985, 1989; Frankel 1997; Freund 
1998; Freund and McLaren 1998; Frankel and Rose 2000; Rose 2000), or to separate 
trade volume into exports and imports and run separate regressions (Tinbergen 1962; 
Linnemann 1966).
Frankel (1997) considered it acceptable to use combined export and import 
volume for simplicity sake as well as to avoid getting into the realm of macroeconomics. 
Others are content to use only exports (Deardorff 1998; Frankel and Wei 1998). 
(Poyhonen 1963) considered only export volume in one of the earliest uses of the gravity 
equation.
The explanatory variables, DIST, GNP, and POP are elements of the basic gravity 
model. DIST is usually measured along the great circle route between major cities, 
usually the capital, of country i and country j. Exceptions are sometimes made to use a 
more centrally located city or one that is considered to be more of a trade center, such as
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Chicago rather than Washington, D.C. Some researchers add a remoteness measure 
(Frankel and Wei 1998) that is the distance from a country’s average trading partner. The 
intuition is that the more remote a country is from the rest of the world the greater its 
trade volume. We will be content to use only the direct bilateral distance. The distance 
measure is expected to be negative. The further one is from their trading partner the 
higher the transportation costs thus, the lower the trade volume.
GNP or GDP is the most common measure of size. GDP is used in the project 
because of the availability of data and wishing to use the same data source (the IMF) for 
consistency. There does not appear to be any preference in the literature for GNP versus 
GDP. Frankel (1997) found little difference and used GNP due to the availability of data. 
Linneman (1966) considered GDP more appropriate since exports could come from 
either domestic or foreign owned producers. Bergstrand (1985, 1989, 1990) used GDP as 
did Frankel and Rose (2000), Rose (2000), and Freund and Mclaren (1999).
POP is another measure of size and used either singularly or to determine GDP 
per capita.23 Our model uses population data from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics to determine per capita GDP. The standard gravity model predicts that 
countries with similar levels of per capita GDP will trade more than countries with 
dissimilar output (Frankel 1997). GDP and GDP/POP estimates are expected to be 
positive but less than one. Rich countries tend to trade more than poor ones. On the 
other hand, smaller economies are more open to trade than larger ones, thus trade 
increases less than proportional to its size (Frankel 1997).
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In addition to the variables described above, dummy variables for common 
language (LANG) and for countries having a common border (ADJ) are often included.
If country i and country j  share a common language they are given a value of land a 0 
otherwise. Intuitively it is easier to do business with someone who shares your language. 
For countries sharing a common border, the same procedure applies. If country i and 
country j  share a common border they are given a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Again 
intuitively it is easier to trade with ones next door neighbor than someone three countries 
away. Common borders were determined using a CIA regional map available on the 
World Wide Web.
Any number of other variables can be added depending on what is being tested.
In this case, we are interested in first whether or not membership in a PTA, specifically 
the EU, is a significant factor for its members and ultimately we test if having a common 
currency-the euro-is a significant determinate of trade flows. For membership in the EU, 
or for belonging to a common geographical region (CR), countries are given a 1, 0 
otherwise. For being a member of the Euro-zone the same is true: 1 if a member, 0 
otherwise. Other dummy variables such as colonial ties or for being landlocked are 
sometimes included. Historical ties such as those formed through colonial relationships 
can influence trade volume. Familiarity with trading partners and established production 
or transportation facilities are expedients to trade. Whether or not a country is landlocked 
or an island is often considered in trade flows. Landlocked countries, lacking access to 
port facilities, are thought to have higher transportation costs associated with trade
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decreasing the volume of trade. Island nations are more likely to trade. Including too 
many variables uses up degrees of freedom.
The countries used are the set of 23 industrialized countries as categorized by the 
IMF. Data for Belgium and Luxembourg are combined. This gives us a data set of 462 
points (22 x 21) for a given year. This includes all of the fifteen EU countries and 
accounts for 68% of world trade. Broader studies such as Frankel and Rose (2000) and 
Rose (2000) use all countries. We are interested only in what effects the introduction of 
the euro has had on trade between EU countries and other industrialized countries. We 
conduct the analysis for 1987, 1992, 1997, and 1999 the only year for which data for the 
euro is available.
Ordinary least-squares regression analysis will be used to estimate the effects the 
various explanatory variables have on the dependent variable, in this case the trade flow 
between country i and country j. Applied properly to an adequate data set, OLS gives a 
reliable estimate of the effect each variable has on the trade flow. OLS technique fits a
line that minimizes the vertical sum of the squared deviations from the fitted line
N(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998). Formally OLS is: Minimize ^  (Y,- Y,)2 where Y, = a +
j=i
bXi represents the equation for a straight line with intercept a and slope b. Y, is the actual 
value of Y for observation i and corresponds to the value of X for that observation, while 
N  is the number of observations. Y t h e  fitted or predicted value of Y,, is the value of Y 
on the straight line associated with observation X.
36
4.0 Empirical Results
4.1 OLS Estimations
Variations of equation (1) were estimated using ordinary least squares. First, 
the following basic gravity equation was estimated:
log(Xy) = a + ^ /log(GDP, GDPy) + / 2log(GDP/pop, GDP/pop,) + ^ log(DISTV) +ey (2)
Equation (2) is expanded to include ADJ, LANG, EU, and CR dummy variables and then
estimated. Finally the dummy variable EURO, indicating membership in the Euro-
system, is added for 1999 to yield equation (2a):
log(Xjj) = a + fi/log(GDP, GDP/) + / 2log(GDP/pop, GDP/pop/) 
+/ilog(DIST/y) +fi4{ADh]) +A(LANG(/)
+ yi(E\Jjj) + y2 (CRjj) + Y3(EUROy)+eij (2a)
The regressions were tested for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Applying
White’s test, we reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 5% percent level of
significance for all models. The regressions were corrected for heteroscedasticity. Table
3 shows the coefficien estimates and the f-statistics corresponding to the heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors.
The Durbin-Watson (DW) test was used to check for serial correlation, the
possibility that residuals are correlated with their own lagged values or in the case of
cross section data the possibility of a missing variable. The DW test statistics for 1987,
1992, and 1997 fell in the indeterminate range. For 1999, however, the DW test statistic
of 1.50 fell below the lower bounds (dpi .57).24 This suggests the possibility that first
order serial correlation is caused by a missing variable. Consequently, a dummy variable,
CR, for belonging to a common geographical region (in this case, Europe, North
^-statistics 
in 
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1.78
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significant at 99%
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Critical t = 
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significant at 95%
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1.645
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America, or Asia/Pacific) was added. Only a small amount of improvement was made in 
the DW statistic for 1987, 1992, and 1997. The DW for 1999 fell slightly from 1.507 to 
1.503. This suggests that the included regressor is not the missing variable we 
suspected.25
Estimates of the coefficients for size, GDP and per capita GDP (GDP/POP) give 
mixed results compared to the literature. The GDP coefficient estimates are consistent in 
magnitude and significant at the 1% level for all years. The values are comparable to 
other researchers’ estimates of about 0.8 (Frankel 1997; Freund 1998; Rose 2000;
Frankel and Rose 2000). Properly interpreted, the coefficients are a measure of short­
term elasticity. A coefficient of 0.8 suggests that for each 1 % increase in GDP, trade 
volume will increase 0.8%. The GDP/POP coefficient estimates were significant only for 
1997 at the 10% level and for 1999 at the 5% level. The coefficient estimates range 
from 0.07 in 1987 to 0.22 in 1997 for the expanded model. Rose (2000) and Frankel and 
Rose (2000) who did projects on the effects of currency unions on trade estimate values 
of about 0.66. Freund’s (1998) estimates range from -0.48 to 0.22 and Frankel’s (1997) 
estimates range from 0.087 to 0.425. One explanation for our lower values is that 
countries in the group of industrialized countries show relatively little variation in per 
capita income compared to the set of all countries.
Distance estimates are highly significant at the 1% level for all years and are 
negatively signed as predicted by the theory. Our estimates range from -0.51 in 1987 to 
-0.70 in 1999 for the expanded equation. The literature varies on the size of the distance 
estimates. Rose (2000) shows a range of-1.09 to -1.15 for the set of all countries.
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Frankel (1997) and Frankel and Rose (2000) show similar ranges. Freund’s (1998) 
results are in the range -0.78 to -0.37 for the set of EU-12 countries.26
For the dummy variables LANG and ADJ (common language and adjacency or 
sharing a common border, our results are closer to those of Freund (1998) who used a 
smaller set of countries than to Frankel (1997), Frankel and Rose (2000), and Rose 
(2000) who used the larger set of all countries. For all years, our coefficient estimates for 
LANG were significant at the 1% level. The positive sign indicates that countries with 
similar languages do trade more. The 1999 LANG coefficient estimate of 0.80 suggests 
that countries with the same language trade nearly two and a quarter times more than 
those with different languages (e°80 = 2.23).
The ADJ dummy is significant at the 1% level in 1987, 1992, and 1997. The 
positive sign indicates a common border is an expedient to trade. It is not statistically 
significant in 1999. It is possible that by 1999, the benefits of membership in the EU and 
the introduction of the euro absorbed some of the adjacency effect. Again, our results are 
more similar to the results from the smaller sample of Freund (1998) than of the larger 
samples already cited.
The effects of membership in the EU significant at the 5% level for 1987, at the 
1% level in 1997and is statistically insignificant in 1992 and 1999. Our estimates are 
0.20 and 0.36 for 1987 and 1997 respectively. Estimates from Rose and Frankel and 
Rose show larger effects from membership in PTAs in general, ranging from 0.67 to 
1.26. Frankel (1997) found when testing for membership in specific PTAs that for a 
member of the EC in 1990 trade increase by 43% (e°36 = 1.43). The dummy CR is
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significant for all years and ranges from 0.52 in 1999 to 0.84 in 1987. It would appear 
that the effects of the common region variable are absorbed over time by membership in 
the EU and the euro-zone effect.
For membership in the euro-zone our results show trade increases about 50%
(e°36 = 1.43) and is significant at the 1% level. As an illustration of the effect 
membership in the euro-zone could have, if the United Kingdom had been a member in 
1999 a 43% increase in trade volume would have translated into an extra $155.5 billion.27 
Rose (2000) found a coefficient of 1.2 in his larger study that included all countries and 
all (17) currency unions for an effect of magnitude 3 (e12 = 3.3). Frankel and Rose 
(2000) found a similar size effect. It would be reasonable to assume that many of the 
benefits of a currency union have already been absorbed by the EU-11, thus accounting 
for our lower estimate.
A note of caution should be interjected at this point. This is a relatively small 
data sample. The sample, members of the group of industrialized countries, is only about 
10% of the population of all countries. The sub-set of countries in the Euro-zone, eleven, 
is only half of the sample population with only one year’s data for the euro. Larger data 
samples yield more reliable results, so while our results can be shown to be statistically 
significant, caution must be exercised in the conclusions reached. Further research in 
subsequent years will either confirm or disprove the tendencies shown here.
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5.0 Policy Implications and Conclusions
5.1 The Political Economy of Trade Policy
Using the gravity model of bilateral trade we have tested to see if membership in 
a currency union, specifically the Euro-zone, has an effect on the volume of trade. Given 
the limited data available, we cautiously conclude there is a positive effect. Our results 
show trade increases for members of the Euro-zone nearly one and a-half times over non­
members. The coefficients for the other variables are consistent, in greater or lesser 
degrees, with other researchers.
Considering the ‘second best’ status of PTAs to multilateral free trade, what are 
the prospects of the continued formation of PTAs and eventually currency zones? Is the 
formation of PTAs building blocks or stumbling blocks? Bhagwati (1999) considers 
them stumbling blocks. Krugman (1991) considers them desirable up to a point. If blocs 
are made up of natural regional partners they are likely to be desirable. On the other hand 
if they are ‘supernatural’ in which transportation costs make them welfare reducing they 
are undesirable.
The move to form PTAs is as likely to be political as from the wish to apply 
sound economic principles. This is particularly evident in the EU and the adoption of the 
euro. Critics point to the loss of monetary and fiscal policy options to individual member 
countries in the face of economic shocks. Cynics point out that some countries lack the 
political will to undertake the structural adjustment necessary to stabilize their economies 
and make them competitive in the world economy. They would rather pass the buck to a
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collective central bank. Others view the ECB as preferable to the German Bundesbank 
making economic policy for the rest of Europe.
Proponents point to gains to European commerce with the reduction in transaction 
costs realized with a common currency. The results of our study suggest trade has 
increased due to the euro. Increased trade is a catalyst to increased economic growth 
(Frankel and Rose 2000). Supporters of the Euro-zone envision an economic power to 
challenge the United States. Critics fear and supporters envision a United States of 
Europe.
Will other PTAs follow suit and adopt a single currency? While early evidence 
indicates some economic benefits to a single currency, the euro has yet to stand the test of 
time. How will the Euro-zone react to a major economic shock to one of its member?
Will the benefits out weigh the costs? These are only some of the questions that will 
require further research.
From our tests of the data we can only conclude that the introduction has had a 
positive impact on trade for the members of the Euro-zone. Analysis of subsequent 
years’ data will be needed to determine the magnitude of the effect. In the meantime, 
how well the euro is received by the citizens of EU will hinge primarily on how the 
politicians react to economic forces that are sure to challenge the Euro-system.
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Table 4
1947
1948
1948
1949 
1951
1954
1957
1962
1968
1973
1979
1986
1989
History of the European Community
Truman Doctrine announced by US. Marshall Plan for the economic 
reconstruction of Europe. Establishment of GATT.
"Benelux customs union between Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. Congress of Europe meets in the Hague to discuss concept 
of a federal Europe."
"Treaty of Brussels establishing the Western Union - Belgium, France, 
Netherlands, & the UK."
Signing of the Washington Treaty founding NATO.
"Treaty of Paris creates European Coal & Steal Community (ECSC) - 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, & Luxembourg (The Six)."
Treaty of Brussels expands to include Germany & Italy. Becomes 
Western European Union (WEU).
The Six' sign the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community (Common Market). EURO ATOM Treaty establishes the 
European Atomic Energy Commission.
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) established.
Customs duties for intra-community trade in manufactured goods 
abolished. Common external tariff established.
"Denmark, Ireland and the UK join the EC."
Greece joins EC. The European Monetary System (EMS) begins 
operation.
Portugal & Spain join EC.
Berlin wall comes down.
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Table 4 (cont.)
1990 Establishment of European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD).
1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU-Maastracht Treaty) signed. Governing 
treaty of the European Union (EU).
1993 "Single Market of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) allows free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital."
1995 "Austria, Finland, and Sweden join EU to bring membership to 15."
1997 Amsterdam Treaty signed. Member states agree to cooperate on economic
policy to stimulate growth and create jobs.
1999 European Monetary Union (EMU) commences for all members except
Greece & Sweden which did not meet criteria & Denmark and UK opted 
out. Leaves 11 countries to adopt the euro.
2001 Greece meets criteria and ascends to the Euro-system.
Source: Leonard (2000)
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Table 5 
1958 
1964 
1968
March 1971
August 1971
October 1972 
October 1973
October 1977 
March 1979
March 1983 
June 1983 
June 1985 
February 1986
"A Chronology of EMU"
Monetary Committee established under the terms of the Treaty of 
Rome.
Committee of Central Bank Governors created to reduce potential 
for conflict between the six member states.
Completion of customs union December 1969. Summit meeting at 
The Hague appoints Pierre Werner to report on how to reduce 
exchange rate volatility.
"Council adopts Werner's three stage plan for EMU based on 
managing exchange rate fluctuations within a 'snake', a European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund, and the liberalization of capital".
Dollar-based international Bretton Woods system collapses: finally 
abandoned in 1973.
Summit meeting in Paris confirms the goal of EMU by 1980.
Middle East war leads to oil supply crisis and financial turbulence: 
Werner Plan scuppered.
Roy Jenkins re-launches idea of monetary union.
"European Monetary System created: small fluctuations around the 
European Currency Unit allowed within an Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, agreed jointly".
Francois Mitterand adopts hard currency approach to stabilize 
franc against the DM.
Stuttgart European Council reaffirms commitment to European 
Union.
Commission launches ambitious programme to 
create the single market by the end of 1992.
"Single European Act signed, strengthening coordination of 
economic policy".
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Table 5 (cont.)
June 1988
July 1988 
June 1989 
February 1992
September 1992 
August 1993 
December 1993
January 1994
December 1995
January 1997
May 1998
July 1998 
January 1999
January 2002 
July 2002
"Source: Duff, 1998.
At European Council in Hanover Helmut Kohl accepts need for 
integration of monetary and economic policy: study of EMU 
commissioned from Jacques Delors.
Liberalization of capital movements.
European Council in Madrid accepts Delors report on EMU.
"Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht: three phase 
approach to EMU enshrined, involving tough convergence 
criteria".
UK and Italy forced to withdraw from ERM.
ERM band widened.
"Commission White Paper on Growth, “Competitiveness and 
Employment".
Stage two of EMU begins: establishment of European Monetary 
Institute(EMI).
Madrid European Council decides on the name 'euro' and adopts 
changeover programme.
"In the absence of a majority of member states meeting the 
convergence criteria, passage to Stage Three postponed".
Brussels European Council decides that 11 member states should 
go forward to stage three.
European Central Bank takes over from EMI.
"Euro to be created. ESCB will take over responsibility for single 
monetary policy, foreign exchange operations and the Target 
payment system".
Euro to appear in notes and coins.
National currencies will cease to have legal tender.
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Table 6
GATT to WTO
1947 23 countries negotiate GATT
1948 GATT provisionally enters into effect. The ITO (Havana) charter is drafted.
1949 Eleven countries participate in the Annecy round of tariff negotiations.
1950 China withdraws from GATT. US fails to ratify ITO.
1951 Torquay round of tariff negotiations. West Germany accedes to GATT.
1955 GATT modifies numerous provisions. Japan accedes to GATT.
1956 Geneva round of trade negotiations.
1957 Creation of European Economic Community
1960 Council of Representatives takes over GATT housekeeping duties.
The Dillon round of negotiations is started.
1962 The Long Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles is negotiated.
1964 The Kennedy round of negotiations begins. Concludes in 1967.
1973 Tokyo round begins. Concludes in 1979.
1974 The Multifibre Arrangement enters into force.
1986 Uruguay round starts.
1990 Canada introduces proposal to establish a ‘Multilateral Trade
Organization’.
1990 GATT ministerial meeting fails to conclude Uruguay round.
1994 WTO is established.
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics
1987 X DIS POPi POPj GDPi GDPj
Mean 2882.974 5450.956 34.68306 34.86766 590.9942 591.4277
Median 604.9000 2299.578 10.00000 10.24000 161.4409 172.4785
Max. 85017.00 19868.12 242.8400 242.8400 4752.500 4742.500
Min. 0.070000 174.0240 0.250000 0.250000 5.406676 5.406676
Std. Dev 7482.927 5865.427 54.06367 53.95515 1055.899 1053.779
Obs. 461 461 461 461 461 461
1992 X DIS POPi POPj GDPi GDPj
Mean 4210.310 5407.845 37.02694 37.06066 885.0036 886.2152
Median 895.5000 2278.697 10.44000 10.44000 247.5600 247.5600
Max. 103860.0 19868.12 255.3700 255.3700 6318.900 6318.900
Min. 1.000000 174.0240 0.260000 0.260000 6.910000 6.910000
Std. Dev 10469.67 5829.409 56.96397 56.94734 1463.234 1462.737
Obs. 458 458 458 458 458 458
1997 X DIS POPi POPj GDPi GDPj
Mean 5411.799 5475.457 37.82909 37.83182 1025.038 1025.036
Median 1205.000 2299.578 10.55500 10.55500 258.5350 258.5332
Max. 177317.0 19868.12 268.0100 268.0100 8300.800 8300.800
Min. 1.000000 174.0240 0.270000 0.270000 7.470000 7.474205
Std. Dev 14555.50 5882.682 59.16078 59.16485 1845.267 1845.268
Obs. 462 462 462 462 462 462
1999 X DIS POPi POPj GDPi GDPj
Mean 6245.165 5449.861 38.24499 38.25265 1100.981 1101.100
Median 1204.000 2299.578 10.63000 10.63000 259.1500 259.1532
Max. 208013.0 19868.12 273.1300 273.1300 9256.100 9256.100
Min. 1.000000 174.0240 0.280000 0.280000 8.810000 8.814931
Std. Dev 18290.89 5863.262 60.12353 60.11890 2028.135 2028.072
Obs. 461 461 461 461 461 461
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Table 8 Confidence Intervals
1987
Variable Coefficient SE fcrit Interval Lower Upper
gdp 0.792602 0.023179 1.96 0.045431 0.747171 0.838033
gdp/pop 0.058609 0.043145 1.96 0.084564 -0.025955 0.143173
dis -0.773443 0.050446 1.96 0.098874 -0.872317 -0.674569
adj 0.321317 0.113597 1.96 0.222650 0.098667 0.543967
Ian 0.691030 0.129707 1.96 0.254226 0.436804 0.945256
ec 0.352220 0.095177 1.96 0.186547 0.165673 0.538767
1992
Variable Coefficient SE tcril Interval Lower Upper
gdp 0.807395 0.023183 1.96 0.045439 0.761956 0.852834
gdp/pop 0.052450 0.098193 1.96 0.192458 -0.140008 0.244908
dis -0.792116 0.053068 1.96 0.104013 -0.896129 -0.688103
adj 0.230882 0.121232 1.96 0.237615 -0.006733 0.468497
Ian 0.542278 0.148237 1.96 0.290545 0.251733 0.832823
ec 0.275564 0.109844 1.96 0.215294 0.060270 0.490858
1997
Variable Coefficient SE fcrit Interval Lower Upper
gdp 0.802989 0.021561 1.96 0.042260 0.760729 0.845249
gdp/pop 0.283691 0.021537 1.96 0.042213 0.241478 0.325904
dis -0.785707 0.101494 1.96 0.198928 -0.984635 -0.586779
adj 0.257650 0.051695 1.96 0.101322 0.156328 0.358972
Ian 0.671070 0.122713 1.96 0.240517 0.430553 0.911587
ec 0.485137 0.109747 1.96 0.215104 0.270033 0.700241
1999
Variable Coefficient SE fcrit Interval Lower Upper
gdp 0.804993 0.023712 1.96 0.046476 0.758517 0.851469
gdp/pop 0.237549 0.126880 1.96 0.248685 -0.011136 0.486234
dis -0.860833 0.054989 1.96 0.107778 -0.968611 -0.753055
adj 0.095397 0.131489 1.96 0.257718 -0.162321 0.353115
Ian 0.777135 0.109531 1.96 0.214681 0.562454 0.991816
ec 0.246863 0.127968 1.96 0.250817 -0.003954 0.497680
euro 0.365552 0.100093 1.96 0.196182 0.169370 0.561734
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Table 9 List of Countries
United States
Canada
Australia
Japan
New Zealand
Austriaab
Belgiumab
Denmark3
Finlandab
Franceab
Germanyab
Greeceab
Iceland
Irelandab
Italy315
Luxembourg315
Netherlands315
Norway
Portugal315
Spain315
Sweden3
Switzerland
United Kingdom3
a=member EU b=member euro-zone
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Table 10 
Xij
GDP
POP
DIS
LANG
ADJ
EU
EURO
Data Appendix
Exports from country i to country j  in millions of $US. Source: IMF 
Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook for the appropriate year. Belgium 
and Luxembourg are combined for all years. West Germany and East 
Germany are combined for 1987; 1992, 1997, and 1999 reflex post 
unification data.
Gross domestic product in millions of $US. Source: IMF International 
Financial Statistics. Figures are reported by the IMF in country currency 
units, which are converted to $US using average period market exchange 
rates. For EU-11, 1999 GDP is in euros. The appropriate euro/$ rate was 
applied for conversion. 1999 GDP figures for New Zealand, Ireland, and 
Portugal are from the CIA Worldfact Book. Available from World Wide 
Web: (http:/www.cia.gov) Belgium and Luxembourg are combined for all 
years. West Germany and East Germany are combined for 1987. 1992, 
1997, and 1999 reflex post unification data.
Population in millions, mid-year estimates. Source: IMF International 
Financial Statistics. 1999 population of Norway is from the CIA Worldfact 
Book. Available from World Wide Web: (http:/www.cia.gov) Belgium and 
Luxembourg are combined for all years. West Germany and East Germany 
are combined for 1987; 1992, 1997, and 1999 reflex post unification data.
The distance measure is the great circle distance between capital cities. 
Provide by Dr. Catherine Co, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Department 
of Economics from Jon Haveman. Available World Wide Web: 
(http.7/intrepid.mgmt.purdue.edu/Jon/Data/TradeData.html)
Language groups provided by Dr. Catherine Co, University of Nebraska 
at Omaha, Department of Economics from Jon Haveman. Available World 
Wide Web: (http://intrepid.mgmt.purdue.edu/Jon/Data/TradeData.html)
Determination of common borders from CIA Worldfact Book 
Available from World Wide Web: (http:Avww.cia.gov)
The 15 members of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
As of 1 January 2001 twelve of the EU-15 countries have meet the 
convergence criteria and are members of the Euro-system: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
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Table 10 (cont.)
CR Common region: United States and Canada; Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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Endnotes
1 The Euro-zone or EU-12 refers to the twelve members of the EU that have adopted the 
euro as their common currency. They include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
2 Quoted in Irwin (1996).
3 Quotations from the Wealth o f Nations are cited according to the conventions of giving 
book, chapter, and paragraph.
4 See O’Brien (1975), for an overview of classical trade thought.
5 The Com Laws were British government policies designed to protect British agriculture 
from cheaper imports.
6 The infant industry argument justifies the use of import tariffs to protect industries in 
developing countries until they are able to compete on the world market.
7 Stagflation was a term coined in the 1970’s to describe the simultaneous high inflation 
and economic stagnation of the period.
8 In 1951, a permanent Council of Representatives replaced the inter-session committee 
that was responsible for day-to-day management.
9 Agreements on services and intellectual property rights were included in the Uruguay 
round.
10 Article XXIV allows PTA’s so long as the arrangements do not exceed any restrictions 
already in place and steps are taken towards multilateral tariff reductions.
11 Adapted from Krugman (1991). Krugman follows an analysis by Jacob Viner (1950).
12 See Frankel (1997) for a review of relevant studies.
13 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay formed the Mercado Comun del Sur (Market 
of the South) in 1991. 19% of the 1994 foreign trade value of $ 131.0 billion was 
intrabloc (Frankel 1997).
14 Formed in 1967, member nations include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 22% of the $529.6 billion in foreign trade in 1994 
was intrabloc (Frankel 1997).
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15 The terms EU (European Union) and EC (European Community) are often used 
interchangeably. Properly, the EC was the designation given to the combining in 1967 of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EC formally 
became the European Union with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
16 The current OECD membership includes 30 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
17 Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg formed the Benelux customs union in 1948.
18 Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Germany.
19 For a review of the Maastricht Treaty see Leonard (2000).
20 See Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) and Kenen and Rodrick (1986).
21 The ‘Protocols’ as well as other documents relating to the ESCB and the ECB can be 
obtained from the World Wide Web @ http://www.ecb.int/ The site also contains 
statistics pertaining to the ESCB and the ECB as well as downloadable research papers 
and publications.
22 The Linder (1961) hypothesis says that countries with similar levels of per capita 
income will have similar preferences and similar but differentiated products, and thus 
trade more with each other.
23 Frankel (1997) shows that it is mathematically equivalent to use population singularly 
or to determine per capita GDP.
24 For n=100+ and df=5+, du-1.57 and di=1.78.
25 Since there are signs of correlation in the residuals, our results should be interpreted 
with caution.
26 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Britain, Ireland, 
Denmark, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Insufficient data was available for Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden who had only just acceded to the EU (Freund 1998).
27 The total trade volume of the United Kingdom for 1999 was $361.6 billion. 1.43 x 
$361.6 billion = $517.1 billion for an increase of $155.5 billion.
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